UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS (HOUSTON)

. Case No. 20-33239

IN RE: Chapter 11

. (Jointly Administered)

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION,

L.L.C., 515 Rusk Avenue

. Houston, TX 77002

•

Debtor. . Thursday, August 31, 2023

. 1:46 p.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION REORGANIZED DEBTORS' MOTION FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER (I) ENFORCING THE CONFIRMATION ORDER AND PLAN AGAINST THE REORGANIZED DEBTORS AND (II) DECLARING THE MEC SETTLEMENT AND NON-MEC SETTLEMENT NULL AND VOID FILED BY DEBTOR

CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, L.L.C. [322] BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID R. JONES UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Debtor: Jackson Walker LLP

By: MATTHEW CAVENAUGH, ESQ.
VICTORIA ARGEROPLOS, ESQ.
EMILY FLYNN MERAIA, ESQ.
1401 McKinney Street, Suite 1900

Houston, TX 77010

(713) 752-4334

Jackson Walker LLP

By: JOHN MACHIR STULL, ESQ. 2323 Ross Avenue, Suite 600

Dallas, TX 75201 (214) 953-6039

APPEARANCES CONTINUED.

Audio Operator: Court ECR Personnel

Transcription Company: Access Transcripts, LLC

10110 Youngwood Lane Fishers, IN 46048 (855) 873-2223

www.accesstranscripts.com

Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.

APPEARANCES (Continued):

For the Debtor: Kirkland & Ellis LLP

By: DANIEL T. DONOVAN, ESQ. 1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20004

(202) 389-5000

For the MEC Class

Plaintiffs:

Lieff Cabraser

By: DANIEL SELTZ, ESQ.

250 Hudson Street, 8th Floor

New York, NY 10013

(212) 355-9500

Law Office of Larry D. Moffett, PLLC

By: LARRY MOFFETT, ESQ.

39 County Road 231 Oxford, MS 38655 (662) 298-4435

For the Non-MEC Class Plaintiffs:

Kessler Topaz Meltzer & Check, LLP

By: TYLER GRADEN, ESQ. 280 King of Prussia Road

Radnor, PA 19087 (610) 667-7706

Donovan Litigation Group, LLC

By: MICHAEL DONOVAN, ESQ.

1885 Swedesford Road Malvern, PA 19355

(610) 647-6067

For the A&B Campbell Family LLC Plaintiffs:

Indik & McNamara PC

By: THOMAS S. MCNAMARA, ESQ.

123 South Broad Street, Suite 1200

Philadelphia, PA 19109

(215) 567-7125

For the Tyler Plaintiffs:

Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP

By: IRA N. RICHARDS, ESQ.

1600 Market Street, Suite 3600 Philadelphia, PA 19103-7286

(215) 751-2000

Also Present:

ROBERT ROBINSON CAROL BRITTAIN

RYAN VAN ESLER

(Proceedings commence at 1:46 p.m.)

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, and officially good afternoon, everyone. This is Judge Jones. The time is 1:46 Central. Today is August the 31st, 2023. This is the docket for Houston, Texas. Also on the 1:30 docket, we have the jointly-administered cases under Case Number 20-33239, Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C.

Folks, again, please don't forget to record your electronic appearance. It's a quick trip to the website, a couple of mouse clicks. You can do that at any time prior to the conclusion of the hearing. It is the way that we note your official appearance.

First time that you speak, if you would, please make sure you state your name and who you represent. Really does help the court reporter in the event that a transcript request is made.

Finally, we are recording this afternoon using CourtSpeak. The audio will be up on the docket shortly after the conclusion of the hearing.

I did see one party who hit "five star." I have activated the hand-raising feature. I think I've got somebody on the line that has enjoyed spending the day riding around in their, evidently, convertible, because it's just been windy noise all day long. I don't know where it's from, but I don't want you to suffer through that. So, if you know you're going

to be speaking, "five star" on your phone. You can change your 2 mind at any time. And with that, Mr. Donovan, good afternoon. 3 4 MR. D. DONOVAN: Good afternoon, Judge. Can you hear 5 me okay? 6 THE COURT: Loud and clear. Thank you for checking. MR. D. DONOVAN: Great. Good afternoon. And good 7 afternoon to counsel we've dealt with for some time. 8 9 So, Judge, we're here on behalf of Chesapeake seeking 10 two forms of relief: First, our motion seeks an order 11 requiring counsel to dismiss pre-effective date claims from 12 five cases. Okay? And I'll have some slides in a moment. 13 But, counsel in one of those cases, the Tyler case has already 14 stipulated to that relief. And just before this hearing, we 15 agreed to an order that's going to get filed in the Middle 16 District in that case. 17 Two of the cases, the MEC and the non-MEC, say in the 18 briefing, and I take them at their word, that they're not going 19 to pursue pre-effective date claims, but they haven't dismissed 20 those cases or claims yet, and we believe we're entitled to an 21 order, mostly because I want to make sure if whatever proceeds 22 in front of Judge Mannion in the Middle District is clear, that 23 what is proceeding, what could proceed and what isn't. 24 Two of the cases, the Burkett and A & B Campbell, I 25 did not see a response from them. I don't believe they're

going to, but I haven't seen a response, and we believe we're entitled to an order there. So that's relief number one. 2 3 The second, Judge, we seek an order declaring the MEC 4 and non-MEC settlement agreements with the debtor be declared 5 null and void, and that counsel cannot seek to enforce these 6 agreements with the debtor in another court. 7 Now, the MEC counsel has been straightforward. They said they intend to move in front of the Middle District of 8 9 Pennsylvania with that agreement. The non-MEC in their 10 briefing suggested, although I'm not entirely clear, that they 11 did not intend to pursue the non-MEC settlement, but the door 12 wasn't closed. 13 We believe, per the terms of the agreement and the 14 Fifth Circuit's decision, these agreements with the debtor are 15 now null and void. And in any event, anything related to 16 agreements with the debtor need to be addressed with this Court 17 is our view. It interplays with both the plan, the 18 confirmation order, and we simply believe that it can't go 19 anywhere else. 20 So, Judge, if I could share my screen a bit to show a 21 few slides. 22 THE COURT: You have control. 23 MR. D. DONOVAN: Thank you. 24 THE COURT: Well, while he's doing that, Mr. Michael 25 Donovan and Mr. Seltz, I see you raising your hand. Everybody

will get an opportunity.

MR. D. DONOVAN: So, Judge, I want to start with -you've seen this slide before, which is pretty much the three
key cases we talked about during the case, starting from the
right with the Pennsylvania AG action, which this Court
approved and has been implemented, and Chesapeake has since
been dismissed.

Importantly, as part of that settlement, the royalty owner elections have been implemented. And as Your Honor probably remembers, that going-forward relief was mirrored in the non-MEC and MEC action. The underlying actions, the non-MEC and MEC, are still pending in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, although they are presently stayed, and the judge there has asked for status reports that the parties have filed.

These were the five cases I mentioned and kind of just tried to put where I think the issues are. In the MEC case, pending in the Middle District, they agree no pre-effective date claims will proceed, but we believe we need an order on that or entitled to that or at least a stipulation, and that they intend to seek to enforce the MEC settlement in the Middle District.

The non-MEC is similar, except they said in their briefing they currently don't intend, or something to that effect, to pursue the non-MEC settlement. They intend to litigate.

The Tyler case, we've resolved. Burkett and A & B

Campbell, we didn't see a response. We believe, there,

there's no settlements, but we're entitled to a ruling on the pre-effective date claims.

So, Judge, this is what I said before, and I'm going to address it in this order: first, regarding the pre-effective date claims; and then second, regarding the settlements.

So let me start with -- Your Honor may wonder, why do we have a dispute on the pre-effective date claims when, in their briefs, the plaintiffs say they don't intend to pursue it? As I said, you know, the only complaints that are pending in the Middle District relate to pre-effective date conduct. We believe they don't have claims going forward, but that's not for this court. But we believe those cases either need to be dismissed or we need to have those claims very clearly dismissed out of the case. So, to the extent we appear in front of Judge Mannion in the Middle District, it's very clear what's left or what could be left.

So these are clips from the operative complaints.

And as you can see, they start all the way back, 2010, 2012, and et cetera. I'm not going to repeat this. Your Honor knows, and it's in our brief, but they are claims. They're pre-effective date claims, and the plan discharges them. We believe we're entitled to an order.

Going to the second form of relief, this is where the settlement agreements -- so this is just related to the MEC and the non-MEC. These settlement agreements, we were all together before, I know, but they were with the debtors. They are not with any other entities. They're with the debtors that's under the jurisdiction of this Court. They involve the plan and proceeds, as the agreement itself recognized the distribution of the funds pursuant to the Chapter 11 plan. So any attempt to enforce it would be impacting the plan. And not only does the MEC and the non-MEC settlement agreements recognize that, the Fifth Circuit did as well.

The plaintiffs on the appeals and the briefing also recognize this. I focus on the second bullet. Look, it relates to the debtor. I don't think there could be any dispute about that. And I show this only to show that the plaintiffs at the time had agreed to this as well.

One of the issues in the briefing was one of the terms defined is defined as "court." And it's this court. And that makes sense because any agreement with the debtor, not only under Rule 23, but under bankruptcy law, Your Honor would need to approve it before it could proceed.

What I show here is that the agreement doesn't just mention it once. Many, many of the requirements and terms of the settlements relate to approval by this court. And there's other terms too. I'm not going to go through them, but this is

```
one that seemed quite obvious to me.
 2
              So I come back to where I started. That is, this
    cannot be enforced. If anything related to this agreement with
 3
 4
    the debtor is going to be interpreted or otherwise addressed,
 5
    it needs to be with this court. And with that, I'm happy to
 6
    answer any questions, Judge. We'll pass the podium.
 7
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
              Mr. Donovan. No preference on order, but I saw you
 8
    first. Mr. Michael Donovan. My apologies. Mr. Donovan, I
 9
10
    can't hear you. Had you hit "five star" or perhaps -- some
11
    people do a double mute just to be careful.
12
              Mr. Donovan, I can't hear you. I just want to make
13
    sure -- some people hit "star five" mistakenly. It's "five
14
    star." Only need to do it once. There you go.
15
              MR. M. DONOVAN: Okay.
16
              THE COURT: All right.
17
              MR. M. DONOVAN: Can you hear me now?
18
              THE COURT: Yes, sir. Thank you.
19
              MR. M. DONOVAN: Oh, thank you. Well, good
20
    afternoon, Your Honor. May it please the Court, I'm here on
21
    behalf of the Browns and the non-MEC claims, the non-MEC class.
22
    Let me just highlight, Your Honor, that we have three basic
23
    points. The first is that the non-MEC claims are not contract
24
    or lease language related claims. They are RICO claims with
25
    mail fraud predicate acts.
```

There are two other defendants named in the RICO cases brought by the non-MEC claimants. Both of those defendants are non-debtors. One is Access Midstream, now the Williams Companies, and the other is Domenic Dell'Osso, who was the head of Access Midstream during the relative period -- relevant period. Both of these are defendants and are non-debtors and are not affected by the discharge.

In the non-MEC status report that we filed with the Middle District of Pennsylvania earlier this month, we expressly stated that the non-MEC plaintiffs and the class are not seeking to enforce the settlement agreement that was signed and submitted to Your Honor, and we're not pursuing any damages claims against Chesapeake for pre-bankruptcy gas gathering and transportation charges that were deducted from our loyalties that are covered by this Court's discharge order and injunction.

THE COURT: Got it.

MR. M. DONOVAN: Instead, we advised the Middle

District of Pennsylvania that the litigation that we're

pursuing is only against -- for the pre-discharge period would

be only against the other two defendants and related -- any

related post-bankruptcy inflated revenues that were received by

Chesapeake.

That post-bankruptcy inflated revenue is not covered by the discharge petition, and I think the Fifth Circuit itself

```
1
    recognized that in its decision.
 2
              THE COURT: Got it. So, Mr. Donovan, and my
 3
    apologies for interrupting. Just so we get on the same page,
 4
    there's a key term -- because you've used a couple of different
 5
    terms, one of which I didn't even understand. I don't know
 6
    what a discharge petition is, and I don't think you really
 7
    meant to say that, but the term --
 8
              MR. M. DONOVAN: Oh, I didn't mean to say --
 9
              THE COURT: No, no, no. It's -- the term I want to
10
    focus on, to make sure you agree, is the effective date of the
11
    plan, because that's the black line. I mean, that's -- before
12
    effective date, discharge covers; post-effective date,
    discharge doesn't touch. I just want to make sure you and I
13
14
    are on the same page.
15
              MR. M. DONOVAN: We are on the same page. I should
16
    use (audio interference) date.
17
              THE COURT: Okay.
18
              MR. M. DONOVAN: That's the relevant and that's what
19
    the Fifth Circuit used as well.
20
              THE COURT: Right.
21
              MR. M. DONOVAN: I guess related to the first point,
22
    Your Honor, is there really isn't any case or controversy
23
    before Your Honor with respect to the non-MEC claims. We're
24
    not going to pursue pre-effective date claims against
2.5
    Chesapeake. We have no intention of doing that. We told the
```

Middle District of Pennsylvania that we're not pursuing those claims for damages. And to ask Your Honor to issue an order in this matter is really asking for an advisory opinion that we don't think is proper, given the Fifth Circuit's decision, because it's a non-issue.

So we also, given the Fifth Circuit's decision, submit that the Court doesn't have subject matter jurisdiction because the non-MEC plaintiffs have not and are not pursuing any pre-effective date damages claims against Chesapeake, and we're not pursuing enforcement of the settlement agreement that Mr. Donovan, my brother from another mother, referred to.

And so -- and then for the third point, Your Honor, whether and to what extent Chesapeake received gas revenues post-effective date that were falsely inflated by the deduction of inflated gas gathering and transportation costs is an issue really for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Whether that happened and the extent of it is really what would be litigated before that court, if anything. We don't have any discovery on that. We don't know. But we do know that the same structure that we challenged in the RICO allegations continued to exist post-effective date.

So that's the distinction there. So we respectfully submit that the Fifth Circuit's mandate directs that this post-effective date conduct is beyond the core and "related to" jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. And I think the Fifth

```
1
   Circuit said that at the end of its opinion.
 2
              THE COURT: Yeah. I -- whether they said it or not,
 3
    I mean, obviously it's important to me if the Circuit says
 4
    something, but I agree with you, whether they said it or not.
 5
    Post-effective date, my jurisdiction ends.
 6
              MR. M. DONOVAN: Yes. So those are our points.
 7
    Thank you, Your Honor.
 8
              THE COURT: I got it. All right. Thank you.
 9
              Mr. Seltz? And, Mr. Seltz, I haven't heard you yet.
10
    Had you hit "five star" on your phone? There you are.
11
              MR. SELTZ: Okay. Can you -- is that better?
12
              THE COURT: Yes, sir. Thank you.
13
              MR. SELTZ: Okay. I'm Daniel Seltz from Lieff
14
    Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, and I'm here on behalf of the MEC
15
    plaintiffs. And I want to apologize, Your Honor. I had some
16
    technical difficulties getting onto the audio and was unable to
17
    hear the beginning of Dan Donovan's presentation.
18
              So I can go ahead and make the points I wanted to
19
    make, and I think was able to hear him when he was moving on to
20
    the second point. But if I'm going over ground that Your Honor
21
    doesn't want to go over again --
22
              THE COURT: It's okay. Go ahead.
23
              MR. SELTZ: Okay. And I do apologize. We basically
24
    have just a couple of key points to make here. The first is
    that, in our view, the Fifth Circuit couldn't have been
25
```

clearer. The opening paragraph is that -- of the opinion states that handling these forward-looking cases within the bankruptcy court predicated on 28 U.S.C. Section 1334(a) or (b) rather than in the court where they originated, exceeds federal bankruptcy post-confirmation jurisdiction.

In our view, the Court doesn't need to do much more than look at the plain language of that opinion -- there's similar language elsewhere in the opinion -- to find that it lacks jurisdiction to take any action relating to this settlement.

The MEC class claims are now solely post-petition claims that are outside of this Court's jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit held that the settlement doesn't concern the bankruptcy and repeatedly characterized the settlement as forward-looking.

What we are proposing to do in the Middle District of Pennsylvania is entirely faithful to the Fifth Circuit's holding, which is to take these claims, which the Fifth Circuit said do not belong here, to the court where they originated, and move forward with an otherwise binding agreement.

Now, if the Court does reach the merits of Chesapeake's motion, which is the request to essentially nullify the settlement, it should also deny the relief that Chesapeake is seeking, because, for reasons I can go into, the settlement remains valid and binding on (audio interference).

If I could just briefly touch on a couple of the points that Chesapeake made in its reply, I think -- otherwise, I think we covered a lot of this in our response brief. The first was that Chesapeake argues that the parties have agreed that this Court has jurisdiction over the settlement. And while parties can agree to submit a contract to the jurisdiction of a court, a party can't vest the court with jurisdiction where it doesn't independently have it. That's black letter law in this circuit and everywhere else, the jurisdiction can't be conferred by consent or agreement or conduct.

The next argument that Chesapeake made, and I think I heard Mr. Donovan again refer to this, is that there's jurisdiction here because the settlements directly concern and affect the distributions of the estate property. Again, that's exactly what the Fifth Circuit said these settlements, including the MEC settlements, do not do. I think this is just an attempt to reargue that there's "related to" jurisdiction, and the Fifth Circuit rejected the idea that there's "related to" jurisdiction in finding that these are forward-looking settlements involving forward-looking conduct. The Fifth Circuit explicitly held that this is a settlement that concerns post-confirmation business.

Finally, on jurisdiction, Chesapeake has argued that the Fifth Circuit decision was limited -- decision on

jurisdiction is limited to this Court's decision on preliminary approval and the District Court's final approval of the settlement agreement under Rule 23. But the Fifth Circuit opinion doesn't say that. The holding is much broader.

Again, as I said, it refers to the -- handling these forward-looking cases here exceeds jurisdiction. It said that it was going to discuss whether the -- this Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide these class claims, and it wouldn't make a lot of sense that this Court could exercise jurisdiction over these claims and over the settlement just for the purposes of interpreting it, let alone to nullify it, but then lack jurisdiction to approve the settlement. Meaning that, as a practical matter, the parties could litigate these claims but not settle them here, because all class claims, you know, require court approval, and that's not what the Fifth Circuit said.

So, again, I think that's as far as the Court needs to go. If the Court gets to this -- to Chesapeake's request that the Court declare that (audio interference) to be null and void, I think it should deny that relief first. The idea that the Court can now nullify the settlement because it was premised on approval by the Court, you know, all class settlements require court approval. All class settlements require the supervising court to apply Rule 23, wherever you happen to be.

Here, we will just need to go back to the court that the Fifth Circuit indicated was the correct court to seek approval and go through that process. This was an agreement. The MEC agreement was meant to resolve claims that were originally brought and still remain pending in the Middle District.

The fact that the settlement defines "court" as this Court, again, shouldn't -- that requires an interpretation by this Court of what's material, which we don't think this Court should be doing. But we cited, you know, numerous cases in our response that explain why the definition of "court" is a severable term under Pennsylvania law and the language of the agreement.

This is essentially about venue, which is what's at issue here, and we've provided cases that venue isn't material. Material terms are payment of money and the release, and here, of course, the injunctive provisions which are going to be performed in Pennsylvania. And so I didn't really see an attempt in Chesapeake's reply to argue that -- under Pennsylvania law that -- that who happens to be applying these Rule 23 factors is a material term.

We also argued -- we also cited cases that make it clear that class settlements are enforceable pending court approval. The <u>Curiale</u> case from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has a very fulsome discussion about how the need

```
for court approval doesn't affect the binding nature of the
 1
 2
    agreement. The Fifth Circuit didn't reach Rule 23 factors, and
 3
    there's nothing about its holding that would nullify the
 4
    agreement. I think, Your Honor, I can stop there in case
 5
    Your Honor has any questions.
 6
              THE COURT: No, I don't.
 7
              Anyone else wish to be heard?
         (No audible response)
 8
 9
              THE COURT: All right. Folks, let me tell you that
10
    this is very easy for me. I disagree with Mr. Seltz on what
11
    the Circuit told me to do. I've lived in this circuit my
12
    entire judicial career. I know exactly what they mean when
13
    they say what they said. This had nothing to do with Rule 23.
14
    It had to do with my acting in contravention of my own
15
    confirmation order and plan, which I -- obviously, I didn't
16
    intend to do, but they said I did.
17
              They also applied the standard -- if we remember, I
18
    didn't -- I did the Rule 9019 portion. I didn't certify a
19
    class, and it is black letter law that a debtor can't enter
20
    into a settlement without my approval. Again, this is all very
21
    simple. Given what the Fifth Circuit said, what they directed
22
    to do, there is no settlement because I didn't approve it.
23
    They didn't have the authority to enter into it, because it
24
    contravened my final non-appealable confirmation order and
25
           So I do find that the MEC settlement and the non-MEC
```

settlements, they don't exist. They're null and void. 1 2 Mr. Michael Donovan, I was sensitive to the comments 3 that you raised, and I had looked at the order, and I had 4 gotten away from using the term, effectively, "lawsuits." 5 Because, again, I think you're 100 percent right. I don't 6 think a lawsuit needs to be dismissed simply because there are 7 claims that need to be dismissed. 8 And so what I'm going to do is I'm going to put up 9 a -- I've taken the order that was submitted by Mr. Dan 10 Donovan, and I've changed it. And I would like specifically 11 for you to look at Paragraph 1, because what I've tried to do 12 is to deal only with the plan -- only with the claims that the 13 plan discharged. 14 So give me just a moment and I'll stick that up. 15 Mr. Dan Donovan, I want you to look at it too. 16 MR. D. DONOVAN: Understood. 17 THE COURT: So hold on. Share my screen. That's 18 interesting. All right. That didn't work. Let me try that 19 again. Here we go. 20 So first let me just confirm, Mr. Michael Donovan, I 21 see you looking at the screen, so I assume that you can see it. 22 So, again, wasn't trying to pick on anybody, wasn't trying to 23 single anybody out. What I intended to do and what I think I 24 did was just recognize the effect of the discharge injunction that's in the plan. That just says you can't continue to do --25

```
no one can continue to pursue any claims that arose prior to
    the effective date, and you'll dismiss those claims, if they
 2
 3
    exist, within 14 days.
 4
              Doesn't deal with any pending actions, doesn't deal
 5
    with claims against third parties, doesn't deal with
 6
    post-effective date claims. It just says you'll clean up -- it
    just says you'll clean up your lawsuit to make it consistent
 7
    with the confirmation order.
 9
              I really do want something that other judges can look
10
    at, so that, if there's a criticism, it doesn't come to you
11
    folks, it comes to me, which is where it ought to come to. So
12
    I just wanted there to be a very clear and unambiguous
13
    directive.
14
              So, Mr. Michael Donovan, is there something that I've
15
    missed or that I missed part of your argument?
16
              MR. M. DONOVAN: Well, Your Honor, I have this
17
    hesitation. And you didn't miss -- can you hear me,
18
    Your Honor?
19
              THE COURT: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
20
              MR. M. DONOVAN: I have this hesitation because this
21
    is saying of any kind on account of or in connection with or
22
    with respect to any claim against any of the debtors and/or
23
    reorganized debtors that arose prior to the effective date,
24
    continuing in any manner any action or other proceeding.
25
              Here's my dilemma with that, Your Honor, just as a
```

```
1
    practical matter. We, as you know, have RICO claims. We will
 2
    be pursuing subpoenaed discovery against Chesapeake related to
 3
    those RICO complaint proceedings. So those would be an action
 4
    or proceeding for discovery, though we're not looking to
 5
    recover money from Chesapeake. So I think that --
 6
              THE COURT: I didn't think --
 7
              MR. M. DONOVAN: -- in any manner --
              THE COURT: I didn't think about that. Mr. Donovan,
 8
 9
    would you -- first of all, do you -- I'm sorry.
10
              Mr. Dan Donovan, do you have any issue with the
11
    language that I have proposed? Question Number 2: Do you have
12
    any objection if I added a sentence that this does not pertain
13
    to lawful discovery?
14
              MR. D. DONOVAN: Yes. If I can make a couple points,
    I don't have a problem if we add lawful discovery. I do want
15
16
    to make one point (indiscernible) some language, Judge, just so
17
    it's not kind of (indiscernible). Is Mr. Donovan -- the
18
    plaintiff, Mr. Donovan, not Mike, will make his claims.
19
    There's two points. One is I'm going to have to see those
20
    claims before I can determine whether I believe they're
21
    pre-effective dates (audio interference) claims --
              THE COURT: Of course.
2.2
23
              MR. D. DONOVAN: -- or coming back (audio
24
    interference).
25
              THE COURT: Of course.
```

```
1
              MR. D. DONOVAN: Secondly -- and I've raised this
 2
    with Mike, but we didn't bring the motion yet. I don't believe
 3
    he can bring claims against Mr. Dell'Osso. He was the CFO.
    He's now the CEO. He was a released party under the plan that
 5
    was not objected to by these plaintiffs. That's not in this
 6
    motion. I just want to make that record so nobody thinks
 7
    I'm -- but that's for another day.
 8
              THE COURT: Right.
 9
              MR. D. DONOVAN: I guess two issues with the sentence
10
    here, Judge. I'm just -- "claimants," I'm not sure if that's
11
    the right term since these are folks that didn't make claims.
12
    So I -- in our proposed order, we use the plaintiffs in those
13
    cases. But I know you're trying to go broader. I just raise
14
    that as a question for the group.
15
              I don't have an objection to the other sentence or --
16
    you know, if Mike is entitled to lawful discovery, he's
17
    entitled to it. I don't think this would block him. So I
18
    don't have a problem with that sentence.
19
              THE COURT: How about that? Because I would have
20
    used -- if I was doing bankruptcy, I would have said
21
    "creditors." "Claimants" was my attempt to be a state court
22
    litigator, which I should probably never do.
23
              MR. D. DONOVAN: Yeah, I'm (audio interference)
24
    persons. And the sentence on discovery is not objectionable
25
    for Chesapeake.
```

1 (Pause) THE COURT: Mr. Michael Donovan, did that solve the 2 3 issue that you were raising? 4 MR. M. DONOVAN: Yes, but another issue was raised. 5 Is it the Court's intention to bind Mr. Dell'Osso, even though 6 he was the chief executive officer of Access Midstream? I 7 mean, seems like we're going to be back before Your Honor --8 THE COURT: You may very well be, but that's a 9 separate motion, different issue. What I'm doing today is I am 10 complying with the direction that was given to me by my 11 circuit. 12 MR. M. DONOVAN: Yes, I understand, Your Honor, but I 13 just want it clear on the record that if we go and subpoena and 14 pursue against Domenic Dell'Osso, I'm not going to be hit with 15 a contempt petition where --16 THE COURT: Not out of this order. You may be the 17 subject of a motion brought by Mr. Dell'Osso, if that's his 18 name, that he has been released and you can't pursue it. I 19 don't know, but that's a separate -- you have a right to be 20 heard. You have a right to prepare for that. You have all 21 sorts of other issues that aren't present today. 22 This order would not result in any sort of issue 23 against Mr. Dell'Osso -- again, if I've got his name right. 24 This is simply dealing with following -- I approved a 25 settlement, the Circuit said I didn't have -- I shouldn't have

```
done it, I was in conflict with my own confirmation order, and
 2
    I didn't have the requisite jurisdiction. All I'm doing is
 3
    addressing that issue.
 4
              MR. M. DONOVAN: Uh-huh. Well, the only -- is there
 5
    a way to add language that would say, nothing herein shall
 6
    affect any person's right to seek lawful discovery against
 7
    debtors and/or reorganized debtors and/or any released parties?
              THE COURT: I'll go halfway because we're only
 8
 9
    dealing today with debtors and reorganized debtors. And
10
    Mr. Michael Donovan, not trying to make your life more
11
    difficult. I don't know anything about your litigation, and I
12
    genuinely don't want to, but I'm going to be very careful
13
    because I don't want to put my finger on the scale of something
14
    that I don't understand, and I hope that you understand that.
15
              MR. M. DONOVAN: I do, Your Honor, and I just want it
16
    on record and so that you know, the next time we're before you,
17
    that we're not doing something amiss by continuing to proceed
18
    against Mr. Dell'Osso.
19
              THE COURT: So --
20
              MR. M. DONOVAN: So that if we're in front of you
21
    and -- you're not going to be surprised and I'm not going to
22
    get sanctioned.
23
              THE COURT: Sure. So can I give you -- so let me
24
    be -- back when I was a practitioner, I represented most of the
25
    plaintiffs' bar in Houston. So let me give you just a
```

```
1
    suggestion, and you do whatever you think is right. There is
 2
    nothing that prohibits you from coming in and filing a motion
 3
    that says, this is what I propose to do -- because I have the
 4
    authority to issue advisory opinions under certain limited
 5
    circumstances. There's nothing that would prohibit you from
 6
    coming in, filing a motion says, hey, this is what I want to
 7
    do. You know, everyone say their piece or be quiet.
 8
              And that way, not only do you get the comfort of you
 9
    don't get dragged back here, you also have an order that you
10
    can then show your judge if he or she is asked to grant relief
11
    based upon a bankruptcy case. And I used to do that simply
12
    because -- and no disrespect intended to state court judges --
13
    they don't understand the implications of all of the sections
14
    of the Bankruptcy Code and plan injunctions.
15
              And again, I say that that's what I used to do for
16
    the folks I represented. But you do what you think is right.
17
    If you go pursue Mr. Dell'Osso, this order doesn't affect it.
18
    The confirmation order may affect it. The plan may affect it.
19
    But this order doesn't affect it. It only deals with the error
20
    that I made in approving the settlement and recognizing the
21
    effect of the discharge injunction. Okay?
22
              MR. M. DONOVAN: I understand.
23
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Any other
24
    comments?
25
         (No audible response)
```

```
THE COURT: All right, then. Thank you, folks. With
1
2
    those modifications, I am going to grant the motion as set
    forth in the order that we've interlineated on the record here
 3
 4
    today. That has been signed and it is off to docketing.
 5
              Gentlemen, thank you for the argument. Please enjoy
 6
    your day. You're all excused.
 7
              Those folks who are on -- well, it's 2:30. I have
 8
    eight minutes. Folks who are on for the 2:30, I'll see you in
    eight minutes.
 9
10
              COUNSEL: Thank you, Judge.
11
              COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
12
              THE COURT: Thank you.
13
         (Proceedings concluded at 2:22 p.m.)
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

1	CERTIFICATION
2	
3	I, Lisa Luciano, court-approved transcriber, hereby
4	certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
5	official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the
6	above-entitled matter.
7	
8	Lon Liciano
9	- Just fire and
10	LISA LUCIANO, AAERT NO. 327 DATE: September 5, 2023
11	ACCESS TRANSCRIPTS, LLC
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	